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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1

AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a com-1
mon law trust, and .JOHN PAUL
.TONES, S. LE,VIS CRANDALL,
.JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

vs.

,

Case No.
12887

UEOR<HA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,
a eorporation,
Defendan.t-Appellant.

ANSWER OF PLAINTIFFS - RESPONDENTS TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
Pursuant to Rnle 76(e)(2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, respondents respectfully submit this britif in
answPr to appellant's Petition for Rehearing and brief
in support thereof served and filed August 20, 1973.
Tlw unwarranted attack upon the Opinion of this
Court contained in the introductory statement of appellant's brief need not be answered. Of the five points
1

asserted by appeilant in its Petition for Rehearing, only
one, the first, has not previously been argued. The fP.
maining four points are simply a re-argnment of issu"'
fully briefed and argued before the Court, and
considered and decided by tlw Court. In connection \\ith
these four points, appellant doPs not refer to any evidence or make any argument not presented or cited
previously.
I.

CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTION,
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUSTAINING
THE MONEY JUDGMENT WHILE MODIFYING THE DECLARATORY RELIEF GRANTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Appellant claims that the Court's Opinion and decision is inconsistPnt in holding that appellant should not
be held to a minimmn level of operation at the Sigurd
Plant, and in affinning the money judgment entPl'N by
the trial court. The claim
demonstrates aprwllant':<
failure to read and understand the plain language of
the Court's Opinion. The Court made clear its reaEon
for rejecting the minimum operational level fixed hy the
trial court. The Court observed that the obligation to
operate at such levPl was made dependent upon the
existence of a sufficient markPt in the ·western States
to sell the resulting production, and held that this condition wrongly imposed an obligation upon appellant to
enter and capture a market, if it existed. The Court
concluded that appellant had the right not to enter
such a market if it chose because of unprofitability or
other factors:
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"'rlwrP conld he a market in the area, but G-P
not want to enh•·r it becansP it might be
qnit1• unprofitable.
Finding's fallacy is an
intPrdiction to nse a markd in the area if there
is one." (Opinion, p. 3.)
The Court substituted for the minimum level of operation,.:. <'onditioned upon market availability, a measure
that is muc·h more tangible and easily applied - the
adual amount of g:·ps11m product sold by appellant in
tlw We.'-'tern States. This holding eliminates the complex
qtwstions inherent in the trial court's ruling that might
inri.PPd "provoke perennial litigation" (Opinion, p. 3),
and imposes a reasonabk• and easily applied me·asure
to the obligations of the parties that is more accurately
in acMrd with the terms of the lease than the finding
mad(• h:· tlw trial court.
This Com-t 's holding with respect to appellant's
fnture obligations under the lease, howe,·er, is in no
respect inconsistent with affirmance of the money judgment. The n•cord is clear that in each year for which
the trial court award(•cl damages, appellant in fact had
salPs of gypsum products in the \Vestern States substantially in Pxcess of the measure that the trial court
applied in assessing damages.' Thus, the Court obI. The trial court did not impose any requirement of additional
production at Sigurd for 1965, 1966, or 1967. (Finding of Fact No.
28; PX 139.) It imposed such a requirement only for 1968, 1969 and
1970. (Finding of Fact No. 28; PX 139.) Actual Sigurd production
in each of those years, and the additional production charged by the
trial court to bring production up to 128,539,000 square feet, are
as follows:
Actual Sigurd
Additional Production
Production (sq. ft.)
Charge (sq. ft.)
Total (sq. ft.)
1968
123,166,000
5,373,000
128,539,000
1969
110,549,000
17,990,000
128,539,000
1970
118,122,000
10,417,000
128,539,000
Sources: Finding of Fact No. 28; PX 139, as amended by Findings of
Fact; PX 138 (Sigurd Plant Profit and Loss Statements)
(Continued on next page)
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served that, with respect to the period 1965-70, the
trial court "fairly appraised the situation as to arno1m\:)
due under the lease, possibly even in ddendant's favor.
as not to have been nnsnpported by past reenrds, hut
conservative and just to both sides of this case.'' ( Opinion, p. 4)

Yiewed from tht> iwrnpt>ctive of "-hat the C'onrt ac- i
tuall.'>' held, rather than from ap1wllant's vie1y of what
it erroneonsl)- believes the Conrt did, there is ahsnlntl'ly
no inconsistenc)- beb\·een affinnancl' of the money judgment and revision of the standard for futme f'<mdmt
imposed by the cledaratory jnclpnent. Indeed, this Conrt
like the trial court, has resolved the matter in appellant's
favor and to respondents' detriment, although eertainly
not unfairly so in light of the faets.
Appellant's first point is not a ground for rehearing,
but an illustration that this Court understan<ls hoth the
case and its 01>inion far bdtPr than does appellant.
pellant''s lack of understarnling provicl<>s no basis for
its Petition for Rehearing.
II.
CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTION, THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN AFFIRMING A .JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES FOUND BY BOTH THE
TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT TO HA VE
CAUSED BY APPELLANT'S BREACHES OF THE
LEASE.
In 1968, 1969, and 1970, respectively, the Lovell Plant of appellant
produced 55,172,000 67,390,000 and 69,284,000 square feet (PX 146;
PX 138, Lovell Plant Profit and Loss Statement; Finding of Fact No.
15), substantially all of which was sold in those years in the Wes_tern
States. (Finding of Fact No. 10; Abstract pp. 47-54) In addition
large quantities of product were sold in the Western States m 1967·
1970 from appellant's Acme, Texas, Plant.
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Jn its serond point, a11pellant misconstrues the position of l'Pspond«nts, the· holding of the trial conrt, and the
hnlrling of this Court. Appellant hreached the lease to
1d1ich it was and is hound. The trial conrt found such
hn·aelws to have hf•<'n committed. This Court has affirnwd that finding. Appellant in its Petition for ReJwari11g (loes not contend that there was no breach of
the leasP. The fact of hreaeh having heen established,
a dd(']'ltlination of damages was required. The trial
enurt found that appellant's reeords were improperly
maintained for the damage period, and did not provide
snffieient data to permit a direct determination of net
prnfit, and that use of an appropriate comparative historic-al base pE"riod was required to compute net profits
aml t!t('!'('fon• damages. Tlw trial court considered necesadjn;;t11wnts to tlw hase period
for
dPclin0s in
product priees and other Yariances,
inelnding total sales . . IJJJJl'!la11t"s Petition for Rehearing
fails to refer to these adjustments.
A ppullant 's argmnent proceeds on the false premise
tliat tlu· historical data employed hy the trial court were
\\·it!tout appropriat<, adjustments. The trial court did
firnl t!tnt usP of g:<psnm produd pricr>s in the Sigurd
:Jiarht (tlw \\'pstern States) for tlw damage period was
nmPlinlile lweattSP of the impact upon that market that
n·snltt>(l from ap1wllant's breach of the requirements
]ll'OYision ot' the lease (infnsion of LoYell, ·wyoming,
and .\uue, Tt>xas, production into that market). The
trial c·onrt therefore made the price adjustments on the
hasis of the variations in prices of gypsum products
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during the damage period for the entire balance of the
United States. As this Court observed in its opinion,
page4:
" ... [T]he trial court, using availahle, admissible
evidence, fairly appraised the situation as to
amounts dn0 under the lease, - possihly PVPn in
defendant's favor . . . but conservative and just
to hoth sidt•s of this ('aSt>."
The inherent nnn•aliahility of gypsnm produet prim
in the \Y<•skrn
as a result of appellant's mis('onduct is madP the more clear by evPnts mad<' puhli1· sin('e
the trial of this ease, of which this Conrt may propPrly '
inform itself. In the TV all Products case, the fedPral
antitrust case in California in which appellant was named
as a co-conspirator (and \Yhich appellant cites and r<'lies
npon in its brief in support of its Petition for Rt'lll'aring,
page 10, as it did in its otlwr two briefs in this Court),
appellant and tlw other gypsum cmnpani<'s inrnlnd
have agreed to pay nearly sPventy million dollars in
settlernt'nt. Appellant its<•lf has agre<'d to (·ontrihntr
twelve million dollars to this settlement. (A 11 tit rnst &
Trade Regulation Rl'port No. G2G, August 1-1, 1!J73. page
A-24)
misconduct of appellant in the ver:· market
that is the subject of this east> strongly reinforces the
finding of the trial court, affirmed b:· this Court, that
appellant's misconduct in that market n•quin•d dett>rmination of damages on a basis independent of the
immediate impact of such misconduct.
In support of its second point, appellant, at pag-Ps
11 and 12 of its brief in support of its Petition for Rehearing, cites what it calls "facts" that are misleading,

in('rn11pletc,, and inappositP. No one has ever claimed,
tlw trial f'Onrt di<l not find, and this Court did not hold,
tliat "Sig11rd during an Pra of de11ression should have
rnade profits equal to those made in the indnstry's peak
years." ( AppPllant's Bri(•f, p. 13) Rather, the trial
1·onrt properly held that with appropri.atc adjustments
f111" s111es prices and other 1:ariables, inclu.ding total salPs,
lld profits shonlcl haw been consistent, a holding that
<'annot possibly be refuterl, which is no doubt ·why ap1wllant n<'ver clisf'loses that this was the holding of the
trial court, and does not reeognize that it was the
hol<ling of this Court. The staterrn>nt of plant capacity
addPd in the Sigurd -:\IarkPt in 1906-68 (Appellant's
11riPf. p. 11) is ineorreet and contrary to the record, and
fails to diselose the exceptional fact that apprllant inc1e11sed its markrt JJ<'11ctratio11 in that market in that
];(•riod amost onP hundred percent, to sixteen and onehalf percPnt. (Abstract, p. 100) The reference to comparatin• earnings of appellant's competitors is based
on "fads" de hors this rPeord, found in a case to which
l'PspomlPnts wen• not and are not parties, and in a
1·asp st•ttl<>d hy appellant eontrihuting a paynwnt of
$1'.?,000,000. -:\fore important still, the eomparative earnin,i.;s stafo;ties C'ikd by appellant are 11atio11widr staties, and then•forp comport "·ith tlw priee adjustments
(h;1:-:Pd on national prif'P dPelines) in fact made hy the
trinl 1·01Ht in assessing damages. Again, appellant miswhat the trial court found, as wPll as ·what this
Conrt h<>ld in its Opinion and deeision.
The trial court's damage determination was carefullv made ' and was fnllv,., evaluated by this Court. The
7

chargt>s made by appP!lant simply are not trne. Xo re.
hearing 8hould be granted on the basis of such palpable
misstatements of the fads and history of this eas ...

III.
CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTION,
THE COURT DID NOT FAIL TO APPLY BASIC
AND FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW IN INTERPRETING THE LEASE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
This ar.i-,'lrnH'nt was made
appellant
in
the trial C'OUrt, and 'ms
pn·s(·nt<·d in this
Court in appellant's original and reply hrid's and in
oral arg1111wnt. Stat<·d
the aq..;mnPnt is that tlH·
requir1>ments proYision of thP l<·ase, that "all
requin•ments of tlw l<·ssPe or his assigns shall lw snppliPd
from
demised pn·mises,'' do<'s not lllPan n·hat it says,
but rather that it means "all g-ypsmn reqnin'lll<'llts of
the Sigurd Plant." It is apellant tliat would violat<• "hasit·
and fundamental priuciples of contract law" by simply
eliminating the requirements pnffisions from th<· l<'a,r.
If, contrary to the plain lang-11agP of the lease, tlit> n··
qnfrements eon•nant "·ere held to refrr to th<' requirenwnts of the Si911rd Plo11t ratlwr than to tl1e n•quircments of the "lcsse(' or his assig11s," then - inasrnnch
as appellant is not un<lPr an oblig-ation to OJH='ratP the
Sigurd Plant - it m•<•<l haw no r<'qllirenwnts at all.
and can and \\·ill eirntsculak n·spond<·nts' right;-;. Plainly,
ap1Jellant wants to be fn•e to prodw<· all of it;-;
reqniremt>nts at Lov<'ll, AernC', or :.rny-wher<>
otlwr
than Sigurd, Utah, so as to avoid all oblig-ation:-: to
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respondents, except to pay a nominal annual rental. This
is the very threat against which the requirements covenant of the lease, and only that covenant, affords protedion.

In rejecting appellant's efforts to rewrite the lease
Ji:· PX(·ising the requirements provision, both this Court
and tl1f• trial court have held that the requirements proyision rnnst be constrned in light of the intentions of
t!te parties to the lease. On that basis, the covenant
must lH· restritted to requirements of the lessee or its
assigw.; in the marht rnntemplated for Sigurd at the
tiJlH• tlw leasP "·as drawn, and served by Sigurd for
on·r twPnty yean; thereafter - the \Vestern States.
Snell limitation is plainly in accord with the intentions
of tlw parties, their interpretations of the lease in practil'I', and of applicable law .
. \s has lwen noted, this point previously has been
c·xhan;;tively brided and argued, and decided. The reassertion of tlw argument in this fashion provides no
lm::;is for appellant's Petition for Rehearing.
IV. & V.
CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTIONS, THE
COURT DID NOT ERR IN THE EVALUATION OF
THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE TESTIMONY
OF RESPONDENTS' EXPERT ACCOUNTANT.

The reassertion of this argument is similar to appdlant's third point. It has been made repeatedly, has
hPen fully briefed and argued, and was fully decided hy
this Court. What appellant says about the evidence
9

simply is not tnw. Rr>spondent:-;' uxpert a('ronntant rlirl
not make markding or ec·onornir assmnptions. Tlw clmnagC' calenla tions IWP pared and presrn ted hy him, anrl
relied npon b>- tJw trial court, werr so made as to eliminate the need for exploring any so-<'al!Pd eC'onomi(' or
marketing tJworiPs. Respondents' position is an extremely simple one:
(a) Tn th<' damage iwriod, 10G:5-1970, appP!lant
was mannfaduring the same prodncts as had !wen
manufactured hy appPl!ant and its corporate prrdecessors in prior )TPars, ineluding particularly thP
damag(• calculation bast> period, 10G:2-19fi4. This is
not and cannot reasonahly he eontestc>cl by appellant.
(b) If appellant's eosts of 111annfad11rP anll
sale, prices received on salPs, aml volunw of
had hePn thP same in the damage period as in thr
base iwriod, its net profits "-oulcl have bt-en thP
sanw. 'l'his simple logic is not and eannot reasonahl:·
be contested hy appellant.
(e) Appellant's eosts of manufadnn• WPI"P not
materially differr>nt in the damagP pPriod than in
the hase period. This is uniquely an al'eonntingmatter, since it was fairl>- determinahlP from an
examination of app<'llant's hooks and rPeorcls ]ff
respomlPnts' exiwrt aeconntant, who Pstahlislwd
fact. (PX 135.) 'I'hat <'VidPneP is not confrstPcl h:appellant hecanse it is tnw and cannot n•asonalJh
tw eontestr>d. l\foreover, thr
eviden<·r·
that supports that
is inelnded in thr
record.

10

( d) There was a decline in the prices of gyp:-: um products between the base period and the damage IJf'l'iod. These declines were established by
competent evidence based on appellant's own sales,
and appropriate adjustments were scrupulously
rnadP for eaeh year of the damage period based upon
thP deviation of prices in each such year from prices
JJl'Pvai ling during the base period. Calculation of
th<> actual priees received by appellant during the
bas<> period and damage period years, and calculation of the adjustments to prices for the damage
1wriod years requin•d thereby are also uniquely
aeeounting functions, and w<>re carefully made and
doeunwnted hy respondents' expert ac-countant. (PX
13!)- l-!3.) Curiously enough, appellant not only do0s
not state in its brief that such adjustments were
madP, tht>reby improperly implying to the Court
tliat there \\·<'re no such adjustmt>nts (as by appellant's asst>rtion that repondents argue, and the trial
C'omt and this Court held "that Sigurd during an
pra of deJirPssion should have made profits equal to
thosP madi> in the industry's peak years" at page
1:) of its brief), but aPJwllant does not take issue
\\·ith the facts that comprise such calculations and
a<ljustmt>nts. Again, this is plainly because these
('al<'ulations are correct and the adjustments proper.
thert>fore cannot reasonably take issue
with them.
( e) Th er<> wen' ,·ariations in ,-olmnes of sales
n•qniring adjustments to be made in detennination
of net profits. The adjustments required d0pend,
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of conr:•w, upon the rnling 11md<' with r<""Jlf'd to t]i,.
n'qnir«ments }Jrovision of th<' l<>as<>. If tl1!' rPqnir1>.
m<>nh; prnyision lw ignorPd, as lll'g<·d h:· app<'llant,
then tlw adjn:-:tmcnts to h<> m;Hle are to tlH· attnal
level of sal<'s from the Signrd Plant. If tlH• n•qnin'ments JffO\·ision lw gin•n fair <'t'fect as decided hy thi,
Conrt in it:-: opinion and d<•(·i:-:ion, th<·n :-al<•,; that
:-:hou !cl ha Y<' h(•<·n m;u l<· had t hP n•qu i n·m<'n ts eonrnrn t not h0en hr0aehecl mnst he ad<led to the actual
:;:ales to clPtermin0 th<' lPv<·l ol' sal<·s for arrivinp: nt
nPt profits. Tlws<' calenlations again \H'rP nniqu•·l:·
acconnting funetion:-:, an(l W<'r<' scrnpnlonsl:· ma(le
hy responcle>nts' expe>rt arcountant. TltP floernw·nt."
evidencing these calcnlations are a part of the record. (PX 139-1-+3.) Again, app<'llant do<•s not tah
issue with thP ralenlations, lwrausP it <·annot rl'asonahl:· do so. They arc <'Orrert and accurak
·what the trial eonrt di<l i11 (act, as disti11qnislied
from

what

a]Jpella11t

rlaims that it rlid, was simpl:r

what is sc->t forth ahon'. This Court was elParl:· eorrf'd
in its conclusion that tl1PrP was "<·onsidPrahl<· knowl<•d!.!:P
\\ith respPrt to sound ace01mting prineiplPs, that if
heliewd h:· thP trial (•ourt, snrviYPd tlw tPst of tlH)
parti<•s' agTeernPnt, arqnief-:f'<'JlC'('. a q11artPr ePntnry of
tinw, an<l tlw Prrnlition of aeeonntants <·m1iloyNl 11:·
four preclN·PsHir lPss<:><>S, and orn· af'eonntahlP to <}pf t>n<lant to its pPrhaps <'Conorni(' displPas11n>. '' (Opinion. ]"

4)
Because it eam10t attack the tlwory of the
case nrgPfl hy rp:;:pomlPnts and arlnptcd hy tl1P trial
court and this Court, ap1wllant atta('ks tlw damagP find-
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ings by distortion and indirection. It alleges that responcknts' expert accountant made "assumptions" about
economic and marketing matters that he did not make at
all. It asserts that there are no facts in the record to
the damage determination, which is pl'ainly nntnw. It asserts that respondents' expert accountant was
not qualified to do what he did, and to testify to the
rnattprs to which he testified, which is plainly a misstakrncut of the record, as demonstrated above. It
asserts that the experts called by it were more knowledgeable and "offered persuasive facts to support their opinions." ( p. 27) This assertion is particularly interesting
hecanse appellant called only one witness who could
fairly be called an expert on economic and marketing
mattPrs hy appellant's standard, Mr. James Rosse.
Xt>ithPr
Rosse's opinion testimony nor any "facts
offrn,cl"
him are inconsistent in the least with the
hard fads taken from app!:'llant's own business records
and gk·aned from a comparison of the base period and
the· damage period in any material respects. Indeed, never,
in its original brief, in its revly brief, in oral argument,
or in its brief in support of its Petition for Rehearing,
has appellant stated wherein the record is inconsistent
\rith the damage determination of the trial court.
words havP been written and spoken generalizing about allPged incompetence of witnesses who did
testify, hut not a word has appellant said about the
facts tlia t are in the record. In its brief in support of
Petition for Rd1earing, appeHant does not eyen refer
to thP tPstirnony of l\Ir. Rosse, its economic expert.
Hatlwr appellant relies upon the self-serving testimony
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of its own <'mployees, Messrs. Birch, :McCaskill and
"Tilson, who were not independent in any r0s11ed, who
were not experts, who offered no "facts" to support or
even define the conclusions to which they testifi0d, and
whose testimony, even then, is not necessarily
ent with the damage determination of the trial court as
affirmed by this Court.
The Birch, McCaskill and \Vilson testimony is tainted
by the same improper interpretations of the le'ase and
appellant's obligations th0reunder that rPqnired respondents to initiate this suit in the hope of a rPmPd)· for
appellant's hrPaches of the leas0. ThesP YPry men, particnlarl>· r. \Yilson, had direet c·ha rgP of the opera ti om,
and made the Yery improper decisions, that resultPd in
this lawsuit. Yet theirs is thP t0stimony offered hy
appellant (not th0 testimony of independent experts)
to override history, logic, and the actual results of oprrations as reflected in appellant's own business records.
The trial court and this Court most properl:-.· dPclined
to adopt appellant's position with respert to the deten11ination of damages, and no rehearing should be granted
to reconsider further these same arguments.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to appellant's unsnpport0d assertions that
the Opinion of this Court ''skip[s] over the law, precedent and facts," was "deeidPd on
failed
to give attention "to princ1ples and concepts advancrd
in prior decisions of this Conrt," is "clearly without any
legal foundation," is "inconsistent and illogical within
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its own four corners," and commits so many errors that
appellant must disregard "the lesser important errors
and raise only the most egregious," a thorough reading
of the Court's Opinion and decision, together with the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the material parts of the record, establishes that the Court has
fairly and properly - with the issues prefor decision, and has resolved those issues in fnll
accord with the facts and the applicable law. This case
from the beginning has been a fact case - one the decision of which turned upon a fnll analysis of the facts
and the weight to be accorded competing evidence (and
frequently uncontraverted evidence) contained in the
record. The case has not involved dispositive issues of
law. Tlw trial of this case was conducted with fairness
and ohjectivity by one of the most experienced trial
judges in this state, who spent many months with the
reC'ord lwfore rendering his decision and making exhaustive findings of fact on the controlling issues.
This Court has re-examined the record fully. Even
though this is a case that must be decided on the facts,
thiti Conrt did not rest its decision on the freqnentlystated principle that in such cases the findings of the
trial court mnst be shown to be clearly in error to warrant appellate relief. Rather the Court made a careful
revie\\' of the evidence, as is apparent from the knowledge of the record revealed in both the majority opinion
and in the dissenting and concurring opinion. Appellant
has now had the benefit of two full trials of the facts,
and asks this Court to grant yet another trial of the
facts by way of rehearing. Respondents respectfully
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urge that credence he given to the factual determinations of the trial jndge and three judges of this Colll't.
Appellant has presented no new facts or argumrnts, anrt
has shown no grounds for r<>hE>aring.
appellant's Petition for RP1waring should he denied and tlJP
case remanded to the trial court in accordance with thr
Opinion of the Court.
DATED:

September 10, 1973.
VANCOTT, BAGLEY,
CORN"\V ALL & McCARTHY
Dennis McCarthy
Clifford L. Ashton

AttornP:ys for Respondents
141 East First South StrPet
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) copies of the
foregoing Brief in Answer to Appellant's Petition for
Relwaring were served upon appellant by personal delivery to Parsons, Behle & Latimer (Messrs. George W.
Latimer, Keith E. Taylor, and Roy B. Moore), 79 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for
appellant, this 10th day of September, 1973.
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